A falsidade da incerteza

Qual a sua opinião sobre o fato de muitos cientistas aceitarem a interpretação de Copenhague (7) para a Mecânica Quântica?

Essa interpretação é uma falácia. Baseia-se na premissa de que se uma ação intermediária não pode ser medida com exatidão, então não pode produzir-se com exatidão. É uma falácia porque na primeira parte da premissa a palavra exatidão é usada em sentido operacional, e na segunda parte é usada em sentido ontológico. Isso é errôneo, porque os dois campos não se relacionam.
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Sobre os transcendentais

“Though he doesn’t put it this way, what Polanyi is pointing out here is that modern scientists are implicitly committed to the reality of truth as truth is understood within the doctrine of the transcendentals – that is to say, to truth conceived of as being or reality in its relation to an intellect. The reason they prefer terms like “simplicity” and “economy” is that they tend also to be committed to the assumption that intellect is a highly derivative phenomenon – a mere byproduct of evolutionary history that appears very late in the game as it were – and thus ought not to enter into our characterization of reality at the most fundamental level. And the trouble is that when this reference to the intellect is deleted, it is no longer clear why simplicity and the like ought to be criteria of theory choice.
Keats was right to say that “beauty is truth, truth beauty,” but wrong to follow up this claim with the further assertion that “that is all ye know on earth, and all ye need to know.” For we do need to know something else – namely the traditional, Scholastic metaphysics that makes the first claim intelligible.”
Edward Feser (texto completo)